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PRICE INDEX DISPERSION 
AND UTILITARIAN SOCIAL EVALUATION 
 








The living standard indicator in utilitarian social evaluation 
functions (USEF) is the ratio of a nominal living standard and a price index. 
We show that under weak association of price indices and nominal living 
standards and usual concavity conditions on utility functions, utilitarian 
social welfare increases with price index dispersion when the aggregate 
price level is superior to the arithmetic mean of price indices, and diminishes 
when it is inferior to the harmonic mean. 
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In social evaluation functions, the decomposition of living standard indicators
is usually done by using additive speciﬁcations, to distinguish several sources of
income or risk1. However, living standard indicators can be better seen as a
nonlinear combination of components: on one hand, income or consumption data,
and on the other, prices, household characteristics and environment.
What is the impact of price dispersion on social welfare? To deal with this
question, we study the consequences of the ratio functional form for living stan-
dard variables in utilitarian social evaluation function (USEF), which are the only
social evaluation functions satisfying some attractive axioms2. Moreover, our re-
sults are valid under ‘generalized utilitarianism’3, that is for any impartial social
welfare function.
If the price deﬂation is inaccurate, then apparent welfare diﬀerences between
households may come from price diﬀerences4. Therefore, welfare policies may be
seriously misled by non-deﬂated indicators.
The correlations between components of the living standard on the one hand
play complementary role to their dispersions on the other hand. We focus in this
paper on the dispersions and on cases where the numerator and denominator of
the living standard variable are weakly statistically linked.
The inﬂuence of spatial price deﬂation on social welfare has not attracted
much attention in the theoretical literature5. Price indices are extensively studied
in the theoretical literature6. However, we do not directly deal in this paper with
1 e.g. Khilstrom et al. (1981).
2See for example Chakravarty (1990).
3In this setting, the function u (see below) may be any increasing function of the utility
(Maskin, 1978).
4In this paper, we examine the price dispersion such that it appears through the dispersion
of price indices. Indeed, price indices are suﬃcient statistics for the calculation of real living
standards when nominal living standards are known. Changes in price dispersion across products
are not treated, even if they contribute to changes in dispersion of price indices. Moreover, we
do not deal in this paper with the already studied eﬀect on individual welfare of the instability
in individual prices (Turnovsky, Shalit and Schmitz, 1980, Ebert, 1994). We emphasize that,
although these papers deal with a similar topic, their results rest on diﬀerent mathematical
bases and are not directly related to ours.
5Roberts (1980), Slivinski (1983) and Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (1999) examine
when welfare prescriptions can be independent from the price conﬁguration in the economy.
They ﬁnd it impossible, except for unsatisfactory welfare indicators.
6e.g. Baye (1985), Diewert (1990).substitution eﬀects in price indices.
The results that we present are useful ﬁrstly because they help understand the
impact of the distribution of price indices on social welfare. This may be useful
to study how social welfare is related to price variability, how to model real living
standards for social welfare analysis, and how to deal with missing information
in prices. Secondly, the results reveal cases in which the price index dispersion
is socially advantageous or noxious. Thirdly, they exhibit the special roles of
harmonic and arithmetic means of price indices in welfare analysis.
2. The Result
In welfare analysis, accounting for price diﬀerences across households implies that
the living standard indicator for household i is xi
Ii,w h e r eIi is the price index and
xi is the nominal living standard associated with household i. Ii is assumed to be
strictly positive and xi to be a real positive number7.











where F1 is the marginal c.d.f. of the nominal living standard and F2 is the
c.d.f. of the price index conditional on the nominal living standard,uis the
social utility function that is assumed measurable and increasing (u(y) represents
the welfare of an individual with real living standard y)a n dt w i c ed i ﬀerentiable
to facilitate calculations. W is deﬁned over the set of probability measures on
R × R++ where R++ is the set of strictly positive real numbers. In all this paper
we assume that all the considered integrals are ﬁnite, which is satisﬁed with actual
data and usual functional forms for u.
We next compare the USEF without price deﬂation (I =1for all households),
with the USEF accounting for the price index distribution (using deﬂated living
standard indicators, x/I)8.
7xi could be allowed to be negative to deal with cases of observed net incomes with possibility
of large debt reimbursement, or net agricultural production of farmers in disastrous times when
input value exceeds output value. However, the intuition of the impact of a hign price index is
less clear in these cases.
8Eq. 2.2 may also describe the situation where x is a living standard indicator for which a
crude or non up-to-date price index has been used, while x/I corresponds to a more accurate
deﬂation. Other interpretations are in Muller (2000). Note that it is not true that the price index













No additional normative condition, other than when income is considered
alone, is required to obtain our results. In particular, under a condition of im-
partiality or anonymity, the Pigou-Dalton transfer axiom is equivalent to the
concavity of the social utility function9. To derive results relatively to an aggre-
gate price level deﬁned as the arithmetic mean, we need to consider the function
Kx(I) ≡ u(x
I). Kx is convex if and only if the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient
(RRAC) associated with u(y) (equal to −y.u  /u )i si n f e r i o ro re q u a lt o2 .Kx is
concave if and only if the RRAC ≥ 2.
When assumned in the case where u is understood as individual’s von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility, the normative justiﬁcation of the convexity of Kx is a weak
assumption. Indeed, it is satisﬁed, for example, for u(x)=xα,α > 0 and for
u(x)=l nx. It also corresponds to empirical estimates. Using US data, Gourin-
chas and Parker (2002) estimate the RRAC to be between 0.4 and 1.5. Because the
ratio function (1/I) is very convex, only very substantial concavity u can generate
Kx non-convex in I. We now concentrate on the case of ‘weak statistical asso-
ciation’ of nominal living standards and price indices, deﬁned as follows10,u s i n g
notation F2(.) for the non-conditional cdf of I and F2(.|x) for its cdf conditional
on x.
Condition C1: x and I are said to be weakly statistically associated at






















−∞ u(x/H) dF1(x),w h e r eH is the harmonic mean of price indices.
Condition C2: x and I are said to be weakly statistically associated at





















where ¯ I is the arithmetic mean of price indices.
can be chosen or renormalized arbitrarily since the real living standards and the corresponding
price index must have normative sense.
9Atkinson (1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973).
10Levy and Paroush (1974), Huang et al. (1978) are examples of uses of still stronger inde-
pendence assumptions in welfare analysis.
5The conditions, without apparent normative meaning, state that the USEFs
can be expressed by using aggregate price indices instead of price indices speciﬁc
to each living standard level11. To alleviate the dependence of the consiton on u,
consider the following suﬃcient conditions respectively for C1 and C2 are weaker









IdF2(x) for all x almost surely, i.e.
E(1/I |x)=E(1/I) for all x almost surely.
Condition C4:
U +∞
0 Id F 2(I |x)=
U +∞
0 Id F 2(x) for all x almost surely,
i.e. E(I |x)=E(I) for all x almost surely.
C3 implies that the coeﬃcient of x in the regression of 1/I on x is non sig-
niﬁcant. C4 implies that the coeﬃcient of x in the regression of I on x is non
signiﬁcant.
Although independence restrictions for several sources of risk are not rare in
theoretical welfare or risk analyses (Kihlstrom et al., 1981), some justiﬁcation of
C3 and C4 is useful beyond the insight obtained by looking at a polar case. There
exists empirical and theoretical support for C3 and C4. First, x and I may be
weakly associated because of strong market imperfections disconnecting incomes
and prices. Second, we ﬁnd in Muller (2002) that the independence of I and x
cannot be rejected for rural Rwanda. This is not an isolated result. In Russia
during the latter part of the 1980s, the changes in price levels and in nominal
wages have been found to be unrelated (Koen and Phillips, 1993). Even when the
link between x and I is statistically signiﬁcant, we do not expect it to be strong.
To this extent, the case of weak association provides useful approximative insight.
We obtain:




u(x/H) dF1(x) ≤ u(¯ x/H) (2.3)
11Note that our problem diﬀers from multidimensional welfare analysis in which the utility
function would admit (x,I) as argument (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1982). First, there is no
direct ethical property of u attached to variable I. A multivariate approach based on a joint
generalized concavity in (x,I) would imply normative conditions hard to justify directly (e.g. a
g i v e ns i g nf o ruxI). This would have little sense in our case. Second, multivariate approaches
do not allow us to avoid hypotheses C1 and C2 necessary to make explicit the eﬀects of price
dispersion on welfare in terms of aggregate price indices (H or ¯ I) independent from the nominal
living standard distribution.





















[if morever u is concave] (2.5)








dF1(x) (Jensen’s inequality ap-












−∞ u(x/H) dF1(x) (by C1 and






0 Id F 2(I |x)
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0 Id F 2(I |x)
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(Jensen’s inequality applied to u if morever it is concave). QED.
The deﬂated USEF can therefore be majorized and minorized by USEFs calcu-
lated without price dispersion as soon as the aggregate level of prices is adequately
deﬁned. Since ¯ I ≥ H, eqs. 2.3 and 2.4 can be combined to provide, under the
assumption of RRAC < 2, an upper bound and a lower bound for the USEF that
are based on the sole observation of ¯ I and H. This is useful when the distribution
of prices is unknown, while the value of ¯ I and H are available or can be inferred12.
Since observed ¯ I and H are generally close, the domain of aggregate price level
for which there remains ambiguous results is likely to be narrow. In the case of
Rwanda and Laspeyres indices in four successive quarters of 1982-83, we found ¯ I
equal to 1.028, 1.058, 1.051 and 1.075, and respectively H equal to 1.015, 1.043,
1.034, 1.065 (Muller, 2002). Consider the special case when the distribution of
price indices is lognormal. Then, if lnI ∼ N(µ,σ2),w eh a v eH = eµ−σ2/2 and ¯ I
= eµ+σ2/2. Besides, the Theil index of inequality of the price index in that case is
T = σ2/2=( l n¯ I − lnH)/2.
12Unrelated approaches to derive bounds for poverty are in Bradbury (1997) and for social
welfare in Fleurbaey, Hagneré and Trannoy (1998). In these papers, the authors start from
bounded intervals of equivalence scales and calculate the corresponding bounds of social welfare.
7Proposition 2.2 can be used to express the eﬀect of price dispersion at a con-
stant aggregate level of prices. By stochastic dominance, under C1 and u concave,
the eﬀect of price dispersion at any constant aggregate price level equal or below
H is negative. If on the contrary the price dispersion is deﬁn e di nr e f e r e n c e
to a constant aggregate price level equal or greater than ¯ I, then under C2 and
RRAC ≤ 2,t h ee ﬀect of the price dispersion on welfare is positive, even when
u is not concave. Finally, under C2 and a constant aggregate price level greater
than ¯ I,b u tw i t hRRAC ≥ 2,t h ee ﬀect of the price dispersion becomes negative.
When ¯ I is ﬁxed, then with RRAC < 2, the dispersion of price indices raises
the level of the USEF. This result stems from the asymmetric shape of the inverse
function, implying that the impact of a larger spread of price indices is stronger
for a fall in prices than for an augmentation.
Consider two people who, in situation A, have living standards respectively of
levels 1 and 1 (e.g. their ﬁxed wages) and facing price indices equal respectively
to 2 and 2. Suppose that after further observation we discover that prices must
be corrected so that in situation B the people now face price indices respectively
e q u a lt o :2-1=1a n d2+1=3 .C l e a r l y ,¯ I has not changed. The real living
standards in situation B are respectively equal to 1 and 1/3. Although it depends
on the risk aversion that one consider, many observers would agree that the ﬁrst
person situation has improved much more than the second person situation has
deteriorated. For example, if u(y)=l n y,W(A)  − 1.38 <W (B)  − 1.09;i f
u(y)=
√
y,W(A)   1.41 <W(B)   1.57.
With precautions, the theoretical results of this paper can be extended to
equivalence scales, other functional forms and statistical conditions for the dis-
aggregation of the living standard variable, several factors, inequality and risk
analyses.
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